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[To be published in translation in Human Security, 2019] 
 
THE MYTH OF “UNGOVERNED SPACE” – SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR 
EXOGENOUS STATE-BUILDING AND HUMAN SECURITY 
 
Mats Berdal 
 
Western Anxiety about “Ungoverned Spaces” 
 
Heightened anxiety in the West about “ungoverned territories” as possible 
“breeding grounds for terrorism and criminal activities and launching pads for attacks 
against the United States and Western interests”1 was a direct consequence of the 
events and aftermath of “9/11”. The analysis and dominant policy prescriptions 
proposed for dealing with the challenge of “ungoverned spaces”, however, can be 
traced further back in time; specifically to the “state failure” debates of the 1990s 
when many Western analysts and policy makers came to view the “building” of 
modern liberal states along Weberian lines as the solution to the scourge of civil war 
and deep-seated conflict in the post-Cold War era. In fact, while the underlying 
motives for engaging with “failed states” in the 1990s and “ungoverned space” after 
2001 may have differed, the diagnosis of the core challenge that needed to be addressed 
rested on fundamentally similar assumptions. What were these?  
Both the notion of “state failure” and “ungoverned space” reflect, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, what may, crudely summarised, be described as the Weberian 
conception of the State, of the legal-rational bases of legitimate authority and of the 
proper source of political order. Central to this is the understanding of the State as a 
geographically circumscribed entity within which, through a set of formal institutions, 
it exercises a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence in the enforcement 
of its order”, and over which it asserts a monopoly of governance and rule-making. 
With these powers, the State generates legitimacy through the provision of public goods, 
foremost among them protection and security. Where these conditions are critically 
weakened - whether from the effects of war or a slow hollowing out from within - 
legitimacy seeps away, political order disintegrates and States may, in extremis, 
“collapse” leaving behind “ungoverned territories”. Exogenous state-building, as 
 
1 Rabassa, Angel, et. al., Ungoverned Territories – Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks, RAND Report, 
2007 (https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG561.pdf) 
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attempted in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014, may be viewed as an attempt by 
outsiders to build or reconstitute States in order to prevent the descent into 
“ungovernability”, or, put more positively (as would have been the case in the 
discourse of the 1990s), help lay the foundations for lasting peace and improvements 
in human security. Either way, state-building thus conceived rests on a mechanical, 
technocratic understanding of state failure. To borrow the words of a well-known 
English nursery rhyme, the aim of state-building is to “put humpty dumpty back 
together again”.  
Now, while superficially compelling in the abstract, the actual experience of 
“post-conflict” peace- and state-building over the past three decades has brought the 
limits of the aforementioned understanding of the State, and of the purposes state-
building, into sharp relief, especially so in relation to war-torn and deeply divided, but 
also historically and culturally distinctive, societies and regions. Specifically, the 
experience has shown that the simple notion of “ungoverned space” – an evocative 
phrase often used to conjure up visions of a Mad Max world of savagery, chaos and 
anarchy – is in fact profoundly unhelpful, analytically as well as in purely empirical 
terms. In reality, what Western policy makers have routinely described as 
“ungoverned spaces”– whether along the Pakistani-Afghan border, the Horn of Africa, 
the Sahel or the Venezuelan-Colombian border – are not devoid of governance, even 
though they are located in areas where the reach and authority of central government are 
plainly weak and fragmented. In order to consider some of the implications of this for 
exogenous state-builing and human security, it is necessary to revisit the complex and 
transformative impact of war and conflict on societies.  
 
The effects of War and Protracted Conflict on State and Governance 
 
While invariably destructive in human and material terms, war is also an agent 
of transformation that serves to reorder relationships of power and influence within 
State and society. This is one reason why the idea that States subjected to war and 
violence simply collapse into “chaos” or “ungoverned space” conceals a much more 
complex reality. As ethnographic and other studies of conflict zones have repeatedly 
shown, those who live within war-torn and fragile states – that is, those who live in 
conditions of persistent insecurity and endemic violence where formal institutions of 
State and government are weak to non-existent – are never indifferent in relation to 
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the circumstances in which they find themselves. Politico-military elites and power-
brokers, economic interest groups and civil society actors (including traders, local 
businesses and women’s groups), “ordinary” people concerned with coping and 
survival: all of them adapt and find ways of adjusting to the realities created by war 
and persistent State weakness.  
Now, strategies of adjustment can be primarily predatory in nature, geared 
towards personal enrichment through the capturing of criminal rent and/or the 
exploitation of vulnerable civilian populations through pillaging and various forms of 
illegal and violent taxation. And indeed, in some cases, the criminal interests and 
activities of the political-military elites in power actually come to depend, in symbiotic 
fashion, on the continuation of State weakness and the lack of properly functioning 
and accountable institutions.  
Strategies of adjustment can also, however, be less about predation than about 
taking the necessary steps required to survive and cope in a world where the State no 
longer provides security, effective rule and basic life-sustaining services. Indeed, the 
response of local communities to state fragility and insecurity has often been to create 
informal arrangements which, over time, have crystallised into local, even regional, 
systems of “governance without government”2; systems which in turn may provide the 
basis for more durable political settlements owing to the greater legitimacy they enjoy 
and to their ability better to meet the human security needs of war-weary populations. 
As René Lemarchand observed of Eastern Congo in 2013: “Uneven as the results are 
… informal forms of governance appear to hold considerably more promise than the 
frequently and largely corrupt ‘democratic’ institutions put in place through 
elections”.3 Evidence from other cases have, similarly, pointed to the emergence of 
alternative political orders and systems of governance in zones of conflict. This 
includes Afghanistan where Ashley Jackson has documented how the Taliban’s “battle 
for popular support” since 2014 has grown “into a sophisticated governance structure, 
including the management of schools, clinics, courts, tax collection, and more.”4     
  
 
2 Ken Menkhaus, “Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Building and the 
Politics of Coping”, International Security, Vol. 31, no.3 (Winter 2007).  
3 René Lemarchand, “Reflections on the Recent Historiography of Eastern Congo’, The Journal of 
African History, vol.54, no.3, 2013, p.436. 
4 Ashley Jackson, “The Taliban’s Fight for Hearts and Minds”, Foreign Policy, 12 September 2018. 
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Implications for Policy-Making: The importance of applying a political 
economy lens  
 
Systems of governance that emerge in response to conditions of war and acute 
state weakness should not necessarily – even though they are often approvingly 
referred to as “organic”, “bottom-up” and “authentic” processes - be treated as the 
most promising basis for building peace and addressing human security needs. Plainly, 
as indicated above, local adaptations to state failure and insecurity can also be, and 
have often proved to be, exploitative, violent and illiberal. More often than not, the 
calculations and motives of local actors are likely to be complex and mixed, reflecting 
their particular circumstances and thus resisting easy labelling – a reality that emerges 
clearly from studies of the war in Afghanistan as viewed from the perspective of local 
Afghans.5 The key point here – and also a key lesson for policy makers – is that violent 
conflict and continuing state weakness, rather than simply being viewed as 
manifestations of “anarchy”, must also be understood as a distinctive political 
economy of war and peace; one given by the range of interests that apply and the 
functional utility that some see in their perpetuation. In other words, what needs to be 
analysed and better understood are the alternative systems of power, influence and 
economic activity that crystallise within conflict zones, and, more specifically, the 
interaction of local war economies with the political agendas of conflict actors.  
This is no easy task, not least because political economies mutate and change, 
often rapidly in response to external and internal stimuli, including evolving regional 
and geopolitical circumstances. Moreover, while analytical capacity to better 
understand the dynamics of war zones and fragile states has improved within the 
machinery of Western governments responsible engagement in “post conflict” settings, 
bureaucratic stove-piping and limited political attention span among senior decision 
makers will always complicate the task of translating analysis into meaningful policy. 
For all this, policy-makers wishing to assist in creating conditions that stand a chance 
of enhancing human security in conflict zones have no option but to engage with the 
political economy of conflict-affected states, societies and regions. The value of 
political economy analyses, as Suhrke, Goodhand and Bose observe, is that it helps to 
“de-construct and denaturalise the idea of the Weberian state, blurring the binary 
 
5 Carter Malkasian, War Comes to Garmser – Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier (London: Hurst & 
Co., 2013). 
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distinctions between state and non-state, legitimate and illegitimate, and highlighting 
the networks, coalitions and material foundations that underpin or undermine the 
state.”6 Even if such analysis does not provide clear-cut, let alone politically digestible, 
answers in terms of how best, if at all, to intervene, it directs decision-makers towards 
the kinds of questions that must nonetheless be asked. These include: In what ways 
have war and protracted violence contributed to the growth of informal networks and 
how resilient are these? Where does real power – that is, networks of privilege and 
patronage that have evolved during conflict – lie in “post-conflict” states? Which 
informal practices and actors can be recognised and formalised without threat to 
overall long-term political stability? What is the risk that exogenous state-building 
initiatives will, rather than securing improvements in human security, only serve 
entrench the power and influence of actors with a vested interest in weak states and 
continuing instability? 
  
Implications for Approaches to State-Building  
 
The analysis above has sought to highlight how civil war and state weakness typically 
transform social, economic and political bases of power within society, resulting in the 
emergence of alternative political and economic orders where effective power has 
shifted to informal networks of privilege and patronage. It follows from this that 
strengthening war-torn States and improving human security should never be viewed 
primarily as a challenge of building institutional capacity. The deeper challenge lies in 
finding and effectively supporting a political settlement that reflects and takes account 
of the formal as well as the informal distribution of power, influence and resources 
within society. The notion of a political settlement here should not be confused with 
the formal signing of a peace accord, even though such accords ideally should and, on 
occasion, have been underpinned by common, less formal, understandings of the rules 
forged among social groups, actors and, especially, among the elites that govern, 
organise and regulate access to power and resources within society. Reaching a 
political settlement means agreement on those “rules”, and making the search for such 
settlement more central to the activities of external actors engaged in state and peace-
 
6 Jonathan Goodhand, Astri Suhrke & Srinjoy Bose (2016) “Flooding the lake? International 
democracy promotion and the political economy of the 2014 presidential election in Afghanistan”, 
Conflict, Security & Development, 16:6,p.485. 
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building means shifting focus away from institutional capacity as such to the underlying 
structures of power and influence in society. This, in turn, necessarily entails a 
broader conception of the “state” to include informal actors and networks that have 
prospered in the course of conflict and have sometimes benefited from persistent state 
weakness. This is essential because a functioning and inclusive political settlement – 
one in which key actors and elites see themselves as having a long-term stake – rather 
than just state capacity is necessary for building legitimacy across society for any new 
“post-conflict” dispensation. Focusing merely on formal institutions and the edifice of 
the state, in other words, can divert attention away from the importance of 
considering relationships between different and actors groups in society and how these 
experience the state, including their sense of political and economic 
disenfranchisement, grievance and marginalisation. Considering those relationships is 
also the key to addressing the legacies of human insecurity. 
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